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Abstract  
The European Union and the United States both claim international leadership in disaster 
relief, a high profile area of public concern and a part of each side‘s broadly defined 
foreign policy. The 2010 Haiti earthquake tested the capacities of each side to participate 
actively and deliberately in international disaster relief. Although both the EU and US 
mobilised  a  response  effort  and  undertook  a  range  of  relief  activities,  both  received 
criticism  from  internal  critics  and  external  observers.  To  offer  a  unique  comparative 
perspective, this paper applies the concept of ‗actorness‘ to the EU and US in order to 
enhance our understanding of their respective responses. Normally applied only to the 
EU,  the  actorness  concept  helps  to  capture  behavioural  dynamics  within  a  complex, 
multi-level  system  which  also  characterises  the  US.  We  find  substantial  degrees  of 
actorness  in  both  polities,  with  the  EU  scoring  highly  in  contextual  determinants  of 
actorness but lower in internal factors shaping actorness. The US, normally assumed to 
be  a  complete  global  actor,  scored  well  in  most  categories  but  showed  a  degree  of 
incoherence related to inter-agency and inter-department relations at the federal level. 
These results improve our understanding of EU and US disaster relief efforts and hold 
promise for comparative studies of actorness. 
 
     3 
1.  Introduction 
 
Assisting stricken countries in the aftermath of a major natural disaster has become a 
priority for the international community, led by the United Nations‘ drive to build on-
going and institutionalised cooperation. Within that effort, both the European Union and 
the United States feature prominently. As two powerful  economic blocs with foreign 
policy ambitions, public support for humanitarian relief and two-thirds of the world‘s 
humanitarian assistance resources, the EU and US play leading roles in what might be 
called an international disaster relief regime (Krasner 1983). Participants in that regime 
meet regularly in institutionalised fora, are guided by (mainly informal) rules regarding 
interaction and are called upon to act in disaster situations (Steets and Hamilton 2009; 
Ray-Bennett 2007). At the same time, both the EU and the US have been highly criticised 
for their roles in international disaster relief. During recent emergencies such as the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, the EU, although increasingly speaking and spending as a ‗single voice‘ 
in  humanitarian  crises,  was  seen  as  slow  and  incoherent  in  its  overall  approach  to 
disasters.  The  US,  although  typically  quicker  to  deploy  help  internationally,  was 
criticised  for  poor  internal  coordination  and  inconsistent  public  communication 
(Brattberg and Sundelius, 2011). 
The ambitions of the EU and US to play a strong role in international disaster 
relief, combined with apparent obstacles to such efforts, demand further investigation 
into each polity‘s ‗actorness‘. This paper applies the concept of actorness to unpack the 
empirical features most relevant to determining the extent to which either bloc has ‗the 
capacity to behave actively and deliberately‘ in international affairs (Sjöstedt 1977, 16). 
The actorness concept was first developed in an EU context, but can be applied elsewhere   4 
and  is  constituted  by  variables  that,  in  principle,  are  ‗abstract  from  any  particular 
institutional form‘ (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 214). Thus, as the EU continues to evolve 
as a foreign policy entity and as the US continues to struggle with its international role in 
disaster assistance, a comparison can offer useful insights regarding the capacities of each 
bloc to participate actively and deliberately in international disaster response.
1 
The paper proceeds in the following steps. In section two , we examine existing 
frameworks for studying actorness and devise a  re-categorised  approach  combining 
mainstream perspectives. The analytical sections of  the paper begin with section three, 
which analyses  EU and US actorness in international disaster relief  according to our 
framework of context-, coherence-, capability- and consistency-related categories. The 
conclusion draws together the findings and encourages further research addressing the 
shortcomings of our approach. 
 
2.  Studying Actorness: A Proliferating Field 
The actorness concept evolved as a way to conceptualise the EU‘s role in world affairs 
without relying on traditional indicators based on statehood and rationality. There is no 
need to fully explore here the existing literature, since that task has been undertaken 
competently elsewhere (see, for example, Koops 2011). It is important to note that since 
Sjöstedt‘s  path-breaking  study  (1977),  the  two  dominant  explanatory  frameworks 
designed by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) and Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) have 
                                                             
1   As argued elsewhere, the EU and the US share enough qualities to merit comparison. Many authors 
have noted that the EU, although not a federal state, embodies significant federal features including 
different branches of government in the Brussels political system, executive responsibilities carried out 
by agencies, and supranational authority over member states in some policy areas (see (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001; Menon and Schain, 2006). For a direct comparison of the EU and US in foreign policy 
matters, see Smith 2003, 14-23.   5 
been progressively dismantled for a variety of reasons. Authors argue they are too legal-
rationalistic, too constructivist, not relevant in the light of recent empirical developments, 
or not empirically verifiable (for various critiques, see Missiroli 2001; Van Schaik 2010; 
Thomas  2010).  While  constructive  criticism  is  useful,  it  is  sometimes  motivated  by 
ontological  orientations  or  methodological  preferences.  We  fear  a  proliferation  of 
‗actorness‘ frameworks will undermine an accumulation of knowledge on this topic and 
undercut  explanatory  richness.  For  this  section,  therefore,  we  construct  a  synthetic 
framework for focusing on actorness per se. This framework includes the main variables 
traditionally  associated  with  actorness,  acknowledges  more  recent  contributions,  and 
discusses questions of operationalization. The result, we believe, is a more serviceable 
framework for assessing actorness to a deeper degree. 
The prevailing variables used to  account  for actorness  generally  fall into four 
categories simply described as context, coherence, capability and consistency. Context 
variables include whether an entity is a recognised actor by counterparts in a permissive 
international  system,  or  in  the  case  of  the  EU  by  the  member  states  themselves. 
Coherence  variables  address  whether  the  entity  can  aggregate  values,  preferences, 
institutional procedures and policies. Capability variables consist of factors related to the 
availability of instruments, mechanisms and other resources, and the ability to mobilise 
these towards policy goals. Consistency variables ask whether the entity can carry out 
agreed policies, highlighting compliance of various federal departments and agencies (in 
the case of the US) and Brussels institutions and member states (in the case of the EU) 
with  common  positions.  These  four  categories  are  commodious  enough  to  combine 
prevailing perspectives yet specific enough to offer concrete indicators.    6 
2.1 Context: ‘Favourable conditions for action’ 
Actorness  variables  related  to  context  are  typically  the  starting  point  for  an 
analysis  of  the  EU‘s  role  in  the  world.  Allen  and  Smith‘s  discussion  of  the  EU‘s 
structural presence in the international arena is premised on the notion that ‗the EU is 
perceived  to  be  important  by  other  actors  within  the  global  system‘  (1990).  These 
perception-oriented aspects of context match the emphasis by Bretherton and Vogler on 
‗opportunity‘. They describe opportunity as ‗factors in the external environment of ideas 
and  events  which  constrain  or  enable  actorness.  Opportunity  signifies  the  structural 
context of action‘ (2006, 24). Jupille and Caporaso include a context-related variable in 
terms of ‗recognition‘ from others. Recognition can be measured using two standards. 
Bearing resemblance to opportunity, de facto recognition relates to perceptions of the EU, 
namely how legitimate an actor is in the eyes of others in the international context. De 
jure recognition pertains to diplomatic recognition under international law. This latter 
aspect  is  particularly  relevant  to  the  EU  (which  is  not  universally  recognised  in  the 
international  system  in  comparison  to  the  US).  We  also  group  ‗authority‘  related 
variables, outlined by Jupille and Caporaso (1998), in this category. The EU‘s authority 
to act stems from treaty provisions, internal policy implications, or the judicial principle 
of  ‗parallelism‘.  The  US‘s  authority  to  act  is  conditioned  by  constitution  provisions 
which, for example, gives the executive branch considerable (but not total) power over 
foreign policy. Although the conditions for authority are primarily determined by internal 
governance conditions, we follow Woolcock (2010) in grouping authority as a relatively   7 
constant contextual variable.
2 In sum, context variables in the literature share a number of 
common assumptions and can be measured in formal and informal ways, namely by 
assessing  national  and  international  legal  provisions,  by  examining  third -country 
expectations (via participant interview data and in camera  proposals), and by  pouring 
over post-event reports. 
 
2.2 Coherence: ‘Agreement and alignment’ 
The  next  category  includes  determinants  of  actorness  related  to  coherence. 
Distilled  to  their  essence,  such  variables  concern  the  extent  to  which  four  essential 
elements – values, preferences, procedures, and policies – are compatible and clear in an 
EU context. As set out by Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 219), ‗value coherence‘ implies 
similarity  of  goals  amongst  constituent  units  (notably  member  states  in  the  EU,  but 
including agencies and institutions in both polities) and, as Bretherton and Vogler state 
(2006, 30), shared commitment to a set of overarching principles. ‗Preference coherence‘ 
is an important element in explaining actorness, as the range of preferences amongst 
actors will be a major determinant of political cohesion. The more that the core interests 
of  member  states  and  supranational  institutions  (in  the  EU)  and  states  and  federal 
institutions (in the US) align, the more cohesive an actor either polity is likely to be. The 
question of how to measure national interest, of course, is a long-standing, contested 
problem shaped by ones‘ view of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign 
policy  (and  is  especially  problematic  in  the  case  of  identifying  coherence  in  the  US 
‗national interest‘). ‗Procedural coherence‘ comes from Jupille and Caporaso, who focus 
                                                             
2   We note, however, that some forms of authority for the EU can accumulate incrementally and are 
situation-specific. For instance, member states may ‗allow‘ the Commission to speak for them in mixed 
competence negotiation situations. See Rhinard and Kaeding 2005.   8 
on the importance of the ‗rules and procedures used to process issues where conflict 
exists…  Procedural  cohesion  implies  some  agreement  on  the  basic  rules  by  which 
policies are made‘ (1998, 219). Coherence on the rules of the decision game is seen as 
essential,  not  least  because  a  lack  of  agreement  on  rules,  or  a  dysfunctional  set  of 
procedures for processing policies, is a major handicap to resolving conflicts internally. 
Bretherton and Vogler take a similar approach when they describe  the importance of 
coherent  internal  coordination  procedures  (2006,  30).  Finally,  ‗output  coherence‘ 
concerns whether an actor can devise collective positions in the form of policy outputs. 
As Jupille and Caporaso put it, ‗if member states succeed in formulating policies…more 
cohesion  is  said  to  exist‘  (1998,  221).  Thomas  elaborates  on  that  point,  noting  that 
common policies alone are not enough to influence actorness. He writes that ‗the simple 
adoption of a common policy is less important than its determinacy, meaning how clearly 
it  articulates  the  goal  and  narrowly  it  specifies  the  behaviours  incumbent  upon  EU 
member states and institutions in order to achieve those goals‘ (2010, 7-8). We should 
note that the classic condition of ‗autonomy‘, found in both Sjöstedt (1977) and Jupille 
and Caporaso (1998) is captured by variables measuring different aspects of coherence. 
Coherence-related  variables  are  the  most  diverse  in  any  actorness  framework, 
encompassing  four  relatively  distinct  aspects  of  cohesion.  They  can  be  measured  in 
multiple  ways,  albeit  with  some  difficulties.  Value  coherence  can  be  assessed  by 
evaluating  texts  and  proclamations  (especially  from  a  historical  perspective)  while 
preference coherence is notoriously challenging. Deducing preferences by assuming how 
states will behave under certain conditions is one method, while inducing preferences by 
reviewing diverse empirical sources are other options. However, both must be done by   9 
clearly  stating  assumptions  and  acknowledging  limitations.  Procedural  and  policy 
coherence  can  be  studied  in  a  relatively  straightforward  way  through  institutional 
understandings and text analysis.  
 
2.3 Capability: ‘Having instruments, using instruments’ 
A  third  set  of  variables  concerning  actorness  pertains  to  the  practical  tools 
required to act. Hill (1996) argues that ‗true actorness requires not only a clear identity 
and a self-contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to have 
effective  policies‘.  Similarly,  Sjursen  states  that  ‗actorness  cannot  and  should  not  be 
viewed separately from actual capabilities, even though that is the common approach‘ 
(quoted in Toje 2008, 204). Although Jupille and Caporaso downplay the importance of 
actual tools and resources to pursue policy goals, Bretherton and Vogler make it a central 
to their definition of actorness. They call for attention to ‗the availability of, and capacity 
to  utilise,  policy  instruments‘  (2006,  30),  thus  setting  out  a  two-part  definition  of 
capability.  The  ‗availability  of  instruments‘  sheds  light  upon  the  kinds  of  resources 
available, which could range from diplomatic tools to aid mechanisms, and from military 
missions to trade agreements. The ‗capacity to utilise‘ those instruments is a slightly 
different question, not least in the EU context where complex decision procedures may 
hamper the deployment of missions or the disbursement of aid. It should also be relevant 
in a US context where a multiplicity of actors within a multilevel governance context is 
involved (Feiock and Scholz 2010). This latter element of capability focuses attention 
onto  whether existing resources  can be brought  to  bear on a particular problem in  a 
reasonably direct, adaptive and swift way.    10 
Measuring capability-related variables can be done in two steps, one assessing the 
presence of instruments via scrutiny of texts (being careful to gauge the gap between 
intentions  and  realities;  some  tools  and  instruments  are  paper  tigers)  and  the  other 
assessing  the  extent  to  which  these  were  deployed  (in  a  specific  case)  or  easily 
deployable (in general). Empirical sources must be drawn upon here, including policy 
texts, public information, and interview data drawn from key participants. 
 
2.4 Consistency: ‘Sticking to the Line’  
The last category of determinants related to actorness asks whether the actor can 
carry out its decisions and commitments in a consistent fashion. Jupille and Caporaso‘s 
approach  to  consistency  (although  grouped  under  a  ‗coherence‘  label)  concerns 
implementation.  They  argue  that  EU  actorness  depends  on  avoiding  conflict  at  the 
horizontal level amongst national governments or amongst EU institutions or vertical 
level between national governments and EU institutions (1998, 220). The same holds 
true, one can reasonably posit, for states and the federal government in the US. Thomas 
places  strong emphasis  on whether the EU will carry out  what  it has  agreed:  ‗if the 
purpose  of  EU  foreign  policy  is  to  have  an  impact  on  world  order,  then  the  most 
determinate common policies matter little if member states and institutions ignore them 
and pursue their own agenda‘ (Thomas 2010, 8-9). This is a familiar problem in the EU, 
when states may agree on a general EU position but then pursue actions that contradicts 
the common position (at worst) or ignores it (at best). For the US, powerful departments 
and  agencies  can  pursue  goals  in  ways  that  contradict  one  another,  or  which  even 
contradict  presidential  or  ‗lead  agency‘  edicts.  In  short,  the  faithfulness  by  which   11 
constituent parts of a polity carry out a policy in question shapes the extent of actorness. 
Measuring consistency involves close familiarity with debates surrounding the adoption 
of a policy, the content and nuances of the policy in question, and detailed information of 
what member states and EU institutions actually do, both in national capitals, in Brussels, 
and in the ‗field‘. Analysing behaviour is a first methodological step (by scrutinising 
steps  taken  by  national  governments,  for  example,  or  what  threats  and  reassurances 
national  officials  give  to  international  partners).  Empirically  tracking  where  officials 
place their attention and resources is another method to identify consistency in carrying 
out an EU line on a particular international issue. 
To summarise, the major determinants of actorness, as contained in prevailing 
approaches and typically applied to different cases, are most clearly grouped into the four 
categories of context, coherence, capabilities, and consistency. Each refers to an essential 
element of what defines the EU‘s and the US‘s actorness. Measuring variables within 
each  category  may  take  a  variety  of  forms,  but  must  be  empirically  observable.  We 
summarise our re-categorisation in Table 1. 
Table 1. A Synthetic Categorisation for Assessing Actorness. 
Category  Simplified Description  Sub-Variables 
Context  ‗Favourable Conditions‘  i.  Recognition 
ii. Opportunity 
iii. Authority 
Coherence  ‗Agreement and Alignment‘  i.  Values 
ii. Preferences 
iii. Procedures 
iv. Policies 
Capabilities   ‗Having  Instruments  and  Using 
them‘ 
i.  Instruments 
ii. Deployment  
Consistency  ‗Sticking to the Line‘  i.  Horizontal 
ii. Vertical 
   12 
3.  Analysis: Actorness in international disaster relief 
We begin our analysis by applying the actorness framework devised in Section 2 to EU 
and US international disaster response. The goal here is to unpack the various aspects of 
actorness which may—or may not—characterise each bloc in regards to its participation 
in the international disasters response regime, generally, but with reference to the specific 
Haiti case when required for empirical clarity.  
 
3.1 European Union 
Context 
The European Union is a recognised player when it comes to development and 
humanitarian assistance, accounting for a significant portion of the world‘s total aid in 
these areas. The EU Commission is the second biggest humanitarian assistance donor 
followed by several EU member states. Combined, the Commission and EU member 
states accounted for around 39% of the global humanitarian assistance in 2009 (Steets 
and Hamilton 2009; see also Bretherton and Vogler 2006). It is also a leading player in 
terms  of  disaster  relief,  both  in  terms  of  responding  to  emergencies  and  in  terms  of 
supporting  the  international  system.  What  might  be  called  the  international  disaster 
management regime has its origins in UN-sponsored programmes and strategies to make 
local  communities  more  resilient  to  disasters  and  to  improve  international  disaster 
response (Coppola 2007). Following years of coordination problems, in 1989 the UN 
initiated  an  agenda  intended  to  focus  effort  on  improving  local  capacities,  fostering 
greater scientific understanding of disaster response, and better coordinating international   13 
response (Borton 1993). Those goals were further elaborated by the Yokohama Strategy 
(1994),  the  UN  International  Strategy  for  Disaster  Reduction  (2002)  and  the  Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005).
3 These strategies provided the rules and parameters around 
which a regime evolved (Krasner 1983), progressively populated by actors such as 
national aid agencies, international NGOs, and international organisations such as the 
EU. 
Indeed,  since  the  late  1990s  and  the  expansion  of  EU  treaty  authority  in 
international disaster relief (evidenced by the appointment of a European Commissioner 
for international cooperation and crisis management in 2010), the EU has played an 
increasingly high-profile role in the international disaster regime. Most recently, the EU 
took a leading role in the UN‘s Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI) and the 
UN Disaster Risk Reduction Initiative, a concerted push towards improving resilience in 
local  communities  and  ameliorating  the  impact  of  disasters.  By  way  of  comparison, 
European  funding  for  the  UN‘s  International  Strategy  for  Disaster  Reduction  far  out 
outweighs that of other actors, including the US.
4 NGOs, such as the International Red 
Cross/Crescent and Doctors  without Borders, are well-integrated partners in the EU‘s 
development  initiatives,  partnerships  which  tend  to  carry-over  into  disaster  incident 
response. The EU has also deployed disaster response teams and supplies at an ever-
increasing rate (Hollis, 2011), raising its profile in international disaster response staging 
posts. The EU thus appears to score rather highly in ‗context‘ related aspects of incidents 
as  an  entity  with  opportunities  to  legitimately  act,  as  a  recognised  player  in  disaster 
                                                             
3   For more on these agreements, see http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa. 
4   For more information on DRR funding, see http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/donors    14 
response and as a shaper of norms and practices in the international humanitarian aid and 
disaster response regime as a whole.
5 
Coherence 
There are notable examples of ‗value coherence‘ in the EU. Meyer makes the case 
that  EU  member  states,  following  so-called  ‗formative  moments‘  such  as  large-scale 
humanitarian  disasters  in  Bosnia  have  developed  collective  norms  encouraging 
humanitarian intervention. These have also made it possible to overcome differences in 
national interests amongst countries focusing on self-defence (e.g. Germany and Sweden) 
and countries more prone to intervene (e.g. France and the UK). Additionally, all EU 
member states endorse the humanitarian assistance principles of humanity, impartiality, 
independence  and  neutrality  (Steets  and  Hamilton  2009,  21).  The  EU‘s  formal 
commitment to these principles appears quite strong and even proactive, as for example 
documented  in  the  widely  publicised  drive  to  towards  European  Consensus  on 
Humanitarian Aid in 2007, which specifies common values and interests for guiding EU 
action.  The  EU  has  also  collectively  endorsed  and  implemented  the  global  initiative 
aimed  at  linking  relief,  rehabilitation  and  development  (LRRD)  (Commission  2001), 
although LRRD is reportedly low on the list of priorities of EuropeAid, despite it being 
the Commission service officially charged with seeing to LRRD issues (Mowjee 2004, 
12). 
                                                             
5   We should note, however, that the colonial past of some EU countries shapes the EU‘s recognition by 
third countries and opportunities to act. In some contexts the EU is seen as a more legitimate actor than 
individual EU states, especially in areas where an EU state has colonial links (e.g. France and Belgium 
in sub-Saharan Africa). France was keen to work through the EU to address the Haiti disaster not least 
because of its chequered past as a colonial power in the area. EU officials emphasise, and continuously 
strive  to  protect,  their  ‗neutral‘  status  in  disaster  relief  so  as  to  avoid  political  conflict  and  boost 
perceptions of the EU as a legitimate actor abroad.   15 
In terms of procedural coherence, EU responsibilities in the area of humanitarian 
assistance date back to  the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1967, 
which  deepened  Community  involvement  in  food  aid  issues.  As  the  Community‘s 
economic  presence  grew,  this  led  to  increased  EU  responsibility  over  trade-related 
aspects of development. By 1982, the Community had assumed a more proactive role in 
development policy. The end of the Cold War heightened EU ambitions to become a 
player in the area of short-term humanitarian assistance. As such, DG ECHO was created 
to provide emergency assistance. While funding comes from the Community budget, DG 
ECHO  sub-contracts  field  operations  to  more  than  180  organizations  which  have 
partnership  agreements  with  the  Commission.
6  When  it  comes  to  using  military 
contingents in disaster relief, most (but not all) EU member states have signed  the ‗Oslo 
Guidelines‘ for the deployment of military personnel  during disasters.  There is  some 
divergence  between  some  member  states  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  ‗last  resort‘ 
principle, which states that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is 
no comparable  civilian  alternative  and  where only military  assets  can  meet  a crucial 
humanitarian need (Wiharta 2008). Today, responsibilities for responding to international 
crises in the EU are dispersed among various EU institutions and the 27 member states. 
While the member states have traditionally been responsible for handling international 
relief operations, recent disasters such as the 2004 Asian tsunami highlighted the need for 
closer EU cooperation and coordination in this area. Recently, common and stand-by 
civilian capacities are slowly being built to be able to enhance the readiness for future 
external assistance needs. Still, the divisions of judicial and political mandates across the 
                                                             
6   For a list of EU partners, see http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/actors/partners_en.htm    16 
many  relevant  institutions  and  between  the  sovereign  member  states  and  the  supra-
national level remain unresolved. 
Regarding policy coherence, the Commission has taken steps towards developing 
a  comprehensive  and  integrated  approach  to  global  disaster  risk  reduction.  A  key 
document in this regard is the 2009 Commission Communication on ‗EU Strategy for 
Supporting  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  in  Developing  Countries‘,  endorsed  by  both  the 
General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  Councils.  A  steering  group  has  also  been 
established to gather and analyse the EU‘s external actions on disaster risk reduction. The 
EU‘s  own  strategy  for  disaster  risk  reduction  is  fully  in  line  with  the  2005  Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA). 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  held  the  potential  to  improve  the  procedural  and  policy 
coherence of the EU in the area of international disaster response, but does not guarantee 
greater  value  or  interest  coherence  in  the  near  term.  The  Commission  itself  has 
reorganised  to  bring  disaster  relief  and  humanitarian  assistant  under  the  same 
administrative roof (DG ECHO) which should promote more consistency between short 
and more long-term objectives at least in principle.
7 A point of concern though is t he 
creation of a separate disaster response unit inside the new European External Action 
Service (EEAS). Both its mandate and its relationship with ECHO are still unclear. The 
Council retains its Humanitarian Aid Committee, which meets regularly to address  
financial decisions regarding humanitarian assistance. In addition to budgetary issues, the 
                                                             
7   Additionally, In October 2010, the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Disaster Relief and 
Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, announced plans to merge the ECHO and the MIC crisis rooms 
to  create  a  European  Emergency  Response  Centre  located  inside  the  Commission.  This  Center  is 
envisioned  to  serve  as  a  platform  to  provide  a  more  effective  EU  response  in  the  face  of  natural 
disasters. It will link the civil protection and the humanitarian aid authorities in member states to ensure 
a coherent approach to crisis response. A further change would be that that the new Center would have 
access to pre-committed member state capacities on stand-by for EU operations and pre-committed 
contingency plans.   17 
Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid is responsible for policy 
questions regarding humanitarian assistance (Steets and Hamilton 2009, 12). While the 
Commission‘s  role  is  mainly  focused  on  proposing  long-term  policy  decisions  to  be 
adopted by the Council, the Commission also possesses some short-term relief decisions, 
including the mandate to provide up to € 300 million allocated in immediate relief, which 
gives it significant leeway and flexibility over the Council. 
Capabilities 
In  the  areas  of  external  crisis  and  disaster  relief,  the  European  Union  has 
developed a number of distinct instruments for action, responding to a variety of policies 
and  mandates,  including  humanitarian  assistance,  stabilization,  reconstruction,  and 
sustainable development goals. For international crises, the Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism (CPM) can be activated either on an autonomous basis or contribute to an 
intervention organised by an international organization such as the UN. Coordination of 
these activities will then be carried out by the European Commission and the rotating EU 
Presidency. 
The main role of the CPM is to facilitate cooperation in national civil protection 
assistance interventions  in  the event  of major emergencies,  requiring urgent  response 
actions.  The  Mechanism  has  a  number  of  tools  intended  to  facilitate  both  adequate 
preparedness  as  well  as  effective  response  to  disasters.  The  operational  heart  of  the 
Mechanism is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Operating on a 24/7 basis, 
MIC monitors all disasters worldwide and activates for emergency assistance. MIC also 
allows countries – both inside and outside the EU – to access to the community civil 
protection platform, and launch a request for assistance through MIC. Another key role of   18 
the Mechanism is coordinating member state assistance. To this regard, the Mechanism 
has  at  its  disposal  the  Common  Emergency  Communication  and  information  System 
(CECIS),  which  connects  the  31  participating  countries  (Åhman  and  Nilsson  2009; 
Ekengren et al. 2006). In addition, the CPM can deploy assessment and coordination 
teams to carry out needs assessments and coordinate incoming assistance from Europe 
(Commission 2010b). While contributions to the CPM from the member states are still 
voluntary,  the  Mechanism  can  co-fund  transport  of  assistance  up  to  50%  and  help 
organise transport of assistance. Moreover, tension has historically existed between the 
Commission  directorates-general  responsible  for  humanitarian  assistance,  civil 
protection,  development  and  external  relations,  respectively.  The  main  thrust  of  this 
tension stems from disagreements over strategic or operational provisions of emergency 
assistance during disasters. DG ECHO has been criticised for emphasizing response at 
the cost of prevention. Furthermore, DG ECHO maintains a large field presence with 
offices on the ground and with stand by teams ready to respond to overseas disasters. 
The  EU  instruments  for  funding  disaster  preparedness  and  response,  the 
Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), also 
deserve mentioning. Currently, the overall budget of the IfS amounts to € 2.06 billion. 
The  IfS  consists  of  two  components.  The  first  is  a  short-term  ‗crisis  response  and 
preparedness‘ component, providing rapid and flexible funding to prevent conflict, to 
support post-conflict political stabilisation and to carry out early recovery after natural 
disasters whereas the second component is more long-term-oriented and is intended for 
use in more stable contexts.
8 DCI was initiated in 2007 with a budget allocation of about 
                                                             
8   For more information on the Instrument for Stability see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/delivering-
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€  2.2  billion.  The  instrument  is  divided  into  three  components,  all  with  the  aim  of 
providing aid to developing countries in post-crisis situations.
9  
Another set of organizational considerations the EU is civil -military relations at 
the operational level. Following the so-called Petersberg Tasks
10, European military units 
have the authority to engage in ‗humanitarian and rescue tasks‘, but have not yet been 
deployed on strictly humanitarian missions, although military personnel and assets of EU 
member states are increasingly being used in emergency situations (Steets and Hamilton 
2009).  Furthermore,  with  the  creation  of  the  External  Action  Service  (EEAS),  the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) now exists alongside the Crisis Management and 
Planning  Directorate  (CMPD)  and  the  Civilian  Planning  Conduct  Capability  (CPCC) 
within  the  EEAS  organizational  structure,  which  could  improve  coherence  between 
military and civilian planning assumptions. 
Whereas the EU has guidelines and processes for requesting and coordinating the 
use of military assets in international crises and disasters, some member states remain 
reluctant  to  employ  these  assets,  taking  a  more  principled  stance  on  humanitarian 
assistance that favours civil protection means. There is also an on-going debate around 
the need to grant DG ECHO and DG Development access to military capacity, such as 
airlift capability and an EU civil protection force, and whether the established EU Battle 
Groups could be deployed to a disaster site. These debates are bound to increase as the 
officials  consider  how  to  implement  the  Lisbon  Treaty‘s  call  for  a  ‗European 
Humanitarian Aid Corps‘, an initiative likely to confirm divisions amongst EU member 
states  regarding  capabilities:  although  the  EU  has  considerable  international  disaster 
                                                             
9   For more information on the DCI, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm  
10   The  ‗Petersberg  Tasks‘  are  a  list  of  military  and  security  priorities  stemming  from  the  Petersberg 
Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992.    20 
response instruments in principle, mobilising those instruments is sometimes hampered 
by member state disagreement.  
Consistency 
While  jurisdictional  divisions  and  political  disputes  between  national  and 
supranational levels and amongst institutional actors persist, the EU has taken steps over 
the past years to enhance consistency during operations. This includes training and jointly 
agreed protocols amongst European member states and between the EU and UN. More 
generally, a 2010 reorganisation of the Commission seeks improve the ‗ground-level‘ 
coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (a task complicated by the 
Lisbon Treaty‘s introduction of the European External Action Service which serves an 
unclear role in international disasters). One should recall, however, that despite efforts 
over the years to approximate national policies on disaster aid, ultimately each member 
state  remains  responsible  for  providing  assistance.  The  plethora  of  differing,  parallel 
humanitarian  assistance  policies  in  member  states  means  that  priorities  are  not 
necessarily compatible with each other and/or with the EU institutions, thus potentially 
(and often in reality) undermining combined efforts. Indeed, officials interviewed in DG 
ECHO confirmed that a ‗main challenge‘ for them is simply to coordinate national actors 
prone to follow national priorities and to acting spontaneously. As Bretherton and Vogler 
point out, however, to  some degree coordination of EU and member states  has  been 
successful, in that pre-existing contracts between member states and ECHO officials can 
be put in place and a system for exchange of information on humanitarian assistance 
exists (2006, 134). 
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3.2 United States 
Context 
Like the EU, the United States is a major humanitarian donor, counting for a fifth 
of overall global humanitarian assistance in 2009 (Steets and Hamilton 2009). Its share of 
the world‘s total development assistance spending is considerable, accounting for about a 
fifth of overall assistance according to the OECD and making the US the largest bilateral 
donor  of  humanitarian  assistance.
11 The US also plays a key role when it comes to 
international disaster relief, both in terms of supporting the UN system and by providing 
resources and personnel at disaster sites. Like the EU, the US actively supports and plays 
a leading role in the UN ‘s  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  Initiative  (DRR)  and  the  Hyogo 
Framework. For example, the two relevant US aid agencies, USAID and the Office of 
Foreign  Development  Assistance  (OFDA)  participates  actively  in  influencing  the 
development  of  DRR  policies  among  the  UN  humanitarian  agencies  and  other 
organizations. In addition, US experts have contributed to the development of technical 
guidelines, such as the ‗Sphere‘ standards,
12 and provide regular technical expertise to 
other countries on DRR (USAID 2010). Furthermore, the United States has traditionally 
assumed certain responsibilities for assisting its associated territories in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific Ocean with disaster management. It also has bilateral treaty obligations to 
offer disaster assistance to other neighbouring countries in the Western hemisphere. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that the US is a leading player in the international disaster 
                                                             
11  For  more  information  on  international  humanitarian  assistance  figures,  see  http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/0,3746,en_2649_34447_44981579_1_1_1_1,00.html  
12   The Sphere Standards is an in initiative by a number of NGOs to define and upho ld the standards by 
which the global disaster community responds to natural disasters through a set of guidelines contained 
in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.    22 
relief  system,  and  is  generally  seen  as  a  legitimate  player  by  receiving  countries, 
especially those in the Western hemisphere.
13 
In terms of the authority to act, US disaster relief activities are guided by the 1961 
Foreign  Assistance  Act,  the  legal  basis  for  all  forms  of  foreign  aid,  including 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. US Congress, through it s budgetary and 
legislative authority, therefore maintains significant authority over US disaster relief 
policies. The President also possesses significant authority, among other things the ability 
to declare emergencies and authorise the use of resources  earmarked by Congress. The 
US  has  a  designated  lead  agency  for  disaster  relief:  US  Agency  for  International 
Development  (USAID).  Within  USAID,  the  Bureau  for  Humanitarian  Response 
coordinates the agency‘s response to overseas emergencies. However, in recent years it 
has become apparent that several other agencies within the US federal government have 
disaster assistance responsibilities. In some cases, as we review below, this can lead to 
coordination challenges within the US government. 
Coherence 
In the case of the US, one can identify a number of overarching values that stretch 
across  the  federal  government  (and  possibly  into  states)  regarding  disaster  aid  and 
humanitarian  relief.  For  instance,  the  latest  National  Security  Strategy  from  2010 
establishes international assistance as a key part of US foreign policy to be considered 
across the agency/department spectrum. More specifically, the US has created a Global 
Development Strategy that sets out the importance of value coherence within the US 
                                                             
13   This is not necessarily the case in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, where the US is 
perceived as an illegitimate actor by some countries.    23 
government, such as the importance of balancing ‗civilian and military power to address 
conflict, instability and humanitarian crises.‘
14  
Another  key  document  is  the  First  Quadrennial  Diplomacy  and  Development 
Review from 2010. The US is also a signatory and participant in global programmes 
which are norm-based, including the UN‘s Disaster Risk Reduction plans, the LRRD 
initiative  linking  relief  to  rehabilitation  and  development  (LRRD),  and  the 
acknowledgement of common principles in providing humanitarian aid (e.g. impartiality, 
independence and neutrality) (Steets and Hamilton 2009, 21).  
However,  we  discern  some  enduring  conflicts  amongst  both  branches  of 
government and agencies. A closer examination of operating assumptions within USAID, 
for instance, reveals a strong set of principles and values (e.g. ‗multilateralism‘, civilian 
solutions, and human security) which are acknowledged but not necessarily shared by 
other  government  departments  such  as  DoD  (Steets  and  Hamilton  2009).
15  Thus, 
although there is considerable value coherence in the US government regarding disaster 
relief, that coherence does not appear to be complete.  
Similarly, such considerations are likely to affect the degree to which a single 
national interest can be identified and assessed within the US federal government. While 
the US has also signed the Oslo guidelines for the use of military assets in humanitar ian 
relief, it has traditionally taken a more pragmatic approach than most European countries. 
A  study  by  the  Institute  for  Defense  Analysis  from  2001  concludes  that  the  US 
government‘s approach to international disaster relief is fundamentally flawed for  the 
                                                             
14   Document is available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-
global-development-policy    
15   Nevertheless, international disaster relief also represents a growing area of work for the US military, 
documented,  for  instance,  in   the  most  recent  version  of  the  Quadrennial  Defense  Review.  See 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf    24 
following reasons: lack of leadership of the overall international disaster response system, 
lack of institutionalized interagency process, unclear funding mechanisms, and lack of 
strategic planning for response; and international disaster response (Lidy et al. 2001). 
There are few reasons to believe that things have improved significantly since.  
In terms of procedural  coherence, the US  has  experienced cross-governmental 
planning problems in recent years (Coppola 2011; Hermsmeyer 2001). Several agencies 
take role in planning and reacting to disasters. USAID, as mentioned above, takes a lead 
role. Within USAID, which has close connections with the US Department of State, the 
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes responsibility for facilitating and 
coordinating US emergency response abroad. The State Department, in order to improve 
its  ability  to  respond  to  international  crises,  recently  appointed  its  first  Director  of 
Foreign  Assistance  who  is  in  charge  of  the  broader  restructuring  of  US  foreign  aid 
programs that are currently under way. The Department of Defense also maintains certain 
responsibilities in foreign disaster relief and response. At the same time, the external use 
of  internal  ‗homeland  security‘  resources  is  also  becoming  more  common,  as 
demonstrated by the recent Haiti case. FEMA personnel and the Coast Guard – both 
entities  now  located  within  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  –  actively 
participated in the relief efforts in Haiti. In addition, other major US government agencies 
relevant  to humanitarian relief are the Department  of Agriculture, the  Department  of 
Health  and  Human  Services,  and  the  Department  of  State's  Bureau  of  Population, 
Refugees,  and  Migration.  Procedures  for  inter-agency  coordination  are  undergoing 
regular revision within the US government (Coppola 2011).   25 
For instance, a vexing problem in disaster planning and operations within the US 
government has been the civilian-military interface (a problem in Europe, too, as the Oslo 
Guidelines attest). There are now procedures in place for staff secondments in different 
agencies (Department of Defence staff can now be found inside USAID, for example, 
USAID officials are now located in every US regional military command worldwide). 
USAID  established  an  Office  of  Military  Affairs  (OMA)  to  ensure  less  conflictual 
relations  in  disaster  relief  (Steets  and  Hamilton  2009,  24),  while  the  Office  of 
Peacekeeping  and  Humanitarian  Affairs  in  the  Pentagon  directs  military  response  to 
disasters overseas (Sylves 2008). The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian  Assistance,  under  the  US  Pacific  Command,  provides  and  facilitates 
education, training, and research in civil-military operations. Additionally, DoD operates 
the  Overseas  Humanitarian  Assistance  Shared  Information  System  (OHASIS),  which 
enables  US  government  personnel  involved  in  humanitarian  assistance  to  manage 
humanitarian  and  disaster  programs  by  providing  time-sensitive  data  relevant  to  the 
response using the military‘s GIS system. 
Finally, policy coherence appears fairly substantial, in that the US appears to have 
at least an embryonic overarching policy on international disaster relief. While no single 
strategic document for international disaster relief exists, it is possible to decipher such a 
policy through looking at a number of key strategic documents. However, since many of 
these documents  were created through inter-departmental consultation,  final decisions 
were taken by certain departments (such as the State Department), suggesting that not all 
policy preferences within the US government can be taken into account. Moreover, the   26 
fact that US national policy on disaster relief co-exists with department-level policies can 
potentially conflict in both principle and practice.  
In short, the US suffers from some degree of coherence problems as an actor in 
international disaster relief. This stems less from value and interest coherence as from 
procedural and policy coherence: an artefact of the sprawling and oft-disjointed nature of 
agency coordination across the US federal government. 
Capabilities 
The United States has significant military resources on stand-by which can be 
deployed for use in disasters across the world. Responding to humanitarian disasters is 
increasingly  becoming  a  central  activity  for  the  US  military,  especially  for  military 
command  structures  CENTCOM  in  Africa  and  SOUTHCOM  in  Central  and  South 
America (Steets and Hamilton 2009: 15). Potential relief roles for US  forces include 
immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of 
basic  sanitation  facilities  and  shelters,  and  provision  of  food  and  medical  care  (US 
Department of Defense 2009). Concerns surrounding the sovereign debt crisis and the US 
budget deficit (2008 and 2011, respectively) have led to increased concerns that funding 
cuts  to  the US  Department  of Defence  will reduce its  role, and desire  to  engage in, 
overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster response (especially in cases where the US 
has  no  ‗strategic  interests‘
16.  Beyond  military  assets,  the  US  also  has  a  number  of 
(growing)  civilian  capacities.  Similar  to  the  EU‘s  DG  ECHO,  OFDA  works  with  a 
network of implementing partners. But whereas the EU tends to work with international 
NGOs such as the International Federation of the Red Cross, the US is more prone to 
                                                             
16   During the Libyan crisis of mid-2011 many leading US politicians argued that the US cannot simply 
afford conducting another humanitarian mission due to budget constraints.  
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work with the UN agencies (Steets and Hamilton 2009, 17). OFDA can also mobilise 
Disaster  Assistance  Response  Teams  (DARTs)  to  provide  additional  support  during 
specific crisis. These teams can conduct analyses and needs assessments, recommend 
action to headquarters and oversee cooperation with local partners (Steets and Hamilton 
2009, 14-15). DARTs are typically accompanied by a so-called Response Management 
Team (RMT) to coordinate response activities in Washington, DC is also activated. This 
cursory analysis suggests that US capability in terms of disaster response instruments and 
its ability to deploy them is substantial. 
Consistency 
The ability of the US (and its departments and agencies) to ‗stick to the line‘ of 
earlier disaster decisions is fairly strong. A political declaration from the President, or 
more likely a set of goals outlined by the head of USAID, will provide the framework for 
action.  Having  a  lead  agency  take  care  of  negotiations  over  the  UN‘s  Disaster  Risk 
Reduction Initiative has allowed the US to act in a consistent manner on these issues. 
Where consistency problems are more likely to surface is in operational matters, where a 
broad,  national  position  on  a  certain  disaster  will  be  pursued  in  different  ways  by 
different agencies. These conflicts are legion in US disaster response history (namely 
between  the  DoD  and  State  Department),  but  procedural  coordination  reforms  (see 
above) have dampened the tendency for conflicts between US federal  agencies when 
acting abroad. When the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State have 
determined to respond to an overseas disaster or crisis, the National Security Council 
(NSC) normally directs the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance to 
convene  an  International  Development  and  Humanitarian  Assistance  NSC  Policy   28 
Coordination  Committee  (PCC)  to  review  all  pertinent  information  and  recommend 
policy and specific actions. The PCC typically consists of senior State Department and 
DoD  representatives,  USAID,  and  heady  of  other  relevant  agencies.  This  helps  to 
promote consistency in Washington, but does not guarantee it in the field. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper set out to make a rare comparison of the US and EU in international disaster 
response, adding insights to the actor capability of each in this growing area. We found 
significant degrees of actorness on both sides, with the EU scoring highly in context 
related  actorness  but  lower  in  coherence  and  consistency-related  actorness.  The  US, 
normally  assumed  to  be  a  complete  global  actor,  scored  well  in  most  categories  but 
showed a degree of incoherence related inter-agency and inter-department coherence at 
the federal level. On balance, we would thus assume the US to be more effective in the 
international community concerning disaster relief.  
While these findings may not seem particularly surprising, our analysis does offer 
useful new insights into the concept of actorness, generally, and the extent to which we 
find actorness in the EU and US in international disaster relief. Several aspects of the 
study  deserve  further  attention  in  future  analyses.  One  such  aspect  concerns  our  re-
categorized  actorness  framework,  which  is  fairly  specific  to  international  disaster 
response,  also  can  reflect  general  phenomenon  that  might  be  applied  more  broadly? 
Another  related  aspect  relates  to  the  level  of  analysis.  Is  the  actorness  framework 
intended for ‗field level‘ analysis? We believe that a case study like Haiti sheds light on   29 
all actorness-related variables. It may be debateable, however, as to whether this is the 
level of analysis at which to best operationalize actorness. 
In addition, to make this assumption more transparent and specified, future studies 
should also  examine the cases  against the backdrop of  effectiveness.  The ‗actorness‘ 
concept has traditionally been a heuristic device, offering a useful characterization of a 
polity‘s potential to impact upon international affairs. Divorced from the concept is the 
link  with  effectiveness  in  shaping  outcomes.  In  lieu  of  theorizing  this  link,  analysts 
typically equate ‗more actorness‘ with ‗more effectiveness‘, rather than stipulating how 
actorness may lead to different kinds of effectiveness (which can then be empirically 
verified). Future studies should thus analyse the link between actorness and effectiveness. 
In  order  to  do  this  it  is  necessary  to  derive  preliminary  hypotheses  regarding  how 
different actorness variables may relate to effectiveness in influencing international relief 
outcomes. Since actorness is expected to have a practical impact, using the January 2010 
Haiti  earthquake  as  part of the  empirical  analysis  of EU  and US  capacity to  behave 
actively and deliberately – as well as effectively – in international disaster relief would 
seem particularly appropriate.  
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interdisciplinary  nature.  The  objective  is  to  promote  understanding  of  the  issues 
concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing discussions. 
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